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COMMENTARIES
Law Schools, Lawyers, and Tightly Closed Circles
Robert B. McKay*
Lawyers are central to the decisionmaking process in the
United States. That is entirely understandable in connection
with the resolution of the vast array of disputes, civil and criminal, that either end up in court or have the potential for adjudication. American adherence to the adversary system makes lawyers
necessary to advise all parties to all disputes, actual and potential. There are strikingly few alternatives to the adjudication
model. Even arbitration, mediation, and conciliation processes,
useful as they are, are largely administered by lawyers. The
uniquely American rush to the courts has carried with it, however, not only matters that are traditionally "judicial," but general problems of society, large and small, as well.
The fact is that lawyers play a significant, often a dominant,
role in making public policy on the great social issues of the day,
from school desegregation to the siting of nuclear energy plants.
Despite repeated complaints that the dispute-resolution process
has been overjudicialized and that lawyers wield disproportionate
control over the levers of power, there is little indication of a
slackening of the litigation pace or a retreat of lawyers from the
centers of power.
Unquestionably, the United States is the most law-minded
nation in the world. Whether that is good or bad is not the point
here. The reality is that the nearly half a million lawyers in the
United States play the dominant role in deciding disputes between private individuals and are extremely influential in shaping public social policy.
* Director, Program on Justice, Society, and the Individual, Aspen Institute for
Humanistic Studies; former Dean, New York University School of Law, 1967-75.
1. Interestingly enough, the principal effort to find nonlawyer alternatives for dispute
resolution comes from the largest lawyer organization in the world, the American Bar
Association (ABA). The ABA was one of the sponsors of the 1976 Pound Conference on
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice. It has subsequentlv supported experiments in the use of less formal methods of dispute resolution,
such as Neighborhood Justice Centers, and has established a Special Committee on the
Resolution of Minor Disputes.
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The importance of the lawyer's role is further emphasized by
the fact that lawyers have a self-conferred monopoly over all legal
issues. Only lawyers can represent others in court; only lawyers
can give legal advice; only lawyers can authenticate legal documents.
If that is true at the output side of the law, it is also strikingly
true a t the input side, that is, legal education. It is almost impossible to become a lawyer in the United States without attending
a law school for a t least three years of relatively formal study.
Standards for admission to practice are fixed by lawyers; bar
examinations are written and graded by lawyers; discipline and
disbarment standards and procedures are principally controlled
by lawyers.
If the circle does not yet seem tightly enough closed, consider
one final fact. The law schools, as gatekeepers of the profession,
establish their own criteria for admission to the study of law. In
a period when demand for legal education is high-which has
been the case since the mid-Sixties-there is no such thing as an
"open-admissions" law school. Since law professors generally are,
or consider themselves to be, part of the intellectual elite, they
seek students in the same mold-high achievers in primary and
secondary schools, in college, and on the Law School Admissions
Test (LSAT). To be sure, some less-than-superb applicants
slip in because they are sons or daughters of favored alumni,
legislators, or donors to the University. Moreover, in the last
decade preference has sometimes been given to minority applicants to enlarge their representation in law school^.^ In general,
however, the preparation of lawyers is a meritocracy that begins
before college and progresses in a straight line through admission to law school, proficiently testing in law school, bar examination, and admission to the bar. The skills emphasized and
tested remain essentially the same from the LSAT through law
school and the bar examination. It is now understood that the
high achievers on the LSAT are the ones most likely to excel in
law school and to perform well on the bar examination. Whether
they will also be the "best" lawyers, whatever the criteria for
2. But the special admissions program (known to its foes as reverse discrimination)
has been challenged in public institutions as a violation of the equal protection of the laws
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18
Cal. :Id 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U . S . 1090 (1977).
If special admissions programs are held invalid, the elitism of legal education will be
further emphasized as the number of minority students declines further.
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that judgment, is less clear. But that matter is being studied,"
and we should not be surprised if it turns out that the LSAT is a
pretty good prophet at least as to financial success at the bar.
Given this set of circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that
lawyers in the aggregate-the legal profession, as we like to be
called-have been relatively self-satisfied, even arrogant about
their rights and prerogatives, until the last few years. Now, however, no less an authority than the Supreme Court (how could
fellow lawyers be so unfriendly?) has told lawyers that they may
be members of a profession, but it is not so "learned" a profession
as to be exempt from the antitrust laws.' Moreover, the profession
cannot continue its long-cherished practice of self-regulation insensitive to such constitutional commands as the first amendment.5In short, lawyers who wish to inform the public about legal
services they offer (beyond the business card or discreet listing in
the Yellow Pages and approved law directories) must be allowed
to do so. There is a right to speak and a right to listen.
The organized bar may be shaken, but legal education moves
on regally, apparently impervious to change. Perhaps that is as
it should be. For the fact is that legal education in the United
States today is very good indeed. No other nation approaches the
quality, indeed the luxury of the legal education apparatus in the
United States. Teachers, students, libraries, and physical plants
are excellent, often superb, and the level of intellectual excitement is very high. No one should question the attainments, which
are of the very highest order. On the other hand, it is equally
unwarranted for legal educators to sit back on their Blackstones
in real or feigned unawareness that, as the world changes, so
perhaps should legal education.
And so I come at last to the excellent Gee-Jackson study.
Their commendable purpose is to attempt "a critical examination of American legal education." In the process they "raise
some current issues and review certain historical antecedents as
they illuminate those issues." And they further "seek to evaluate
the processes and prospects for stability or change in American
legal education. "6
3. The Competent Lawyer Study, initiated in 1973, is jointly sponsored by Educational Testing Service, the American Bar Foundation, the Law School Admission Council,
and the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
4. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
5. See Rates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Counsel, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809 (1975).
6. Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency,
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Good. High time. But can they pull it off? My answer is a
resounding affirmative, despite initial doubt that they could succeed in so ambitious an undertaking in only about 300 pages. My
original skepticism was not based on lack of faith in the ability
of these two young authors. Their capacity has been amply demonstrated in their two 1975 monographs, Following the Leader?:
T h e Unexamined Consensus in Law School Curricula7 and Bread
and Butter?: Electives in American Legal Education. Both studies provide useful confirmation of points long suspected: that law
schools are essentially imitative in their curricular choices, and
that students choose electives on the basis of real or imagined
advantage in preparation for the bar or in having a record that
will look good to a prospective employer. But neither of the earlier
studies attempted any major probing of legal education in its
entirety.
In fact, there have been only a few efforts to look at legal
education as a whole. Perhaps the best, by A.Z. Reed in 1921,gis
not widely read today. Probably it never was; some of its recommendations are still untried, but continue to be suggested anew
as if in reinvention of the legal education wheel. The most ambitious survey of legal education was compiled for the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS) under the supervision of an
able law school dean."' But the substance behind the mass of notvery-illuminating data was disappointing, and the volume was
not particularly influential.
More recent studies of legal education have been useful, and
each has made specific suggestions for modification and improvement of legal education,ll principally in ways to shorten and intensify the law school experience. But it is scarcely too strong to
say that most of those recommendations have sunk without a
trace into the placid pool of law school self-satisfaction. Even the
most careful evaluation of legal education is not likely to survive
as standard reading matter if its proposals for change are not
1977 R.Y.U.L. REV.695, 698.
7. E. GEE& D. JACKSON,
FOLLOWING
THE LEADER?:
THEUNEXAMINED
CONSENSUS
IN
LAWSCHOOL
CURRICULA
(1975).
8. D. JACKSON
& E. GEE,BREAD
AND B ~ E R ?ELECTIVES
:
w AMERICAN
LEGAL
EDUCATION (1975), reviewed in Kelso, Book Review, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.597.
FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSION
OF THE LAW(1921) (Carnegie Foun9. A. REED,TRAINING
dation for the Advancement of Teaching Bull. No. 15).
10. A. HARNO,
LEGAL
EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED
STATES
(1953).
& T. EHRLICH,
NEWDIRECTIONS
IN LEGAL
EDUCATION
(1972);
11. See, e.g., H. PACKER
CURRICULUM
STUDYPROJECT
COMMITTEE,
TRAINING
FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSIONS
OF THE
LAW:19'71 (P. Carrington ed. 1971) (AALS 1971 Annual Meeting Proceedings, Part One.
Section 11) (Carrington report).
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t.aken seriously.12
Despite the failures of the past, Messrs. Gee and Jackson
plunged ahead. What might have seemed a further handicap-limited experience in legal education-they managed to
turn into the virtue of providing a fresh and nonestablishment
view of legal education.
The special attraction of the volume to me is that the scope
of the undertaking is both so ambitious and so limited. Let me
explain the apparent paradox. On the side of ambition they aspire to no less than a comprehensive review of contemporary
American legal education, including such varied aspects as these:
* A brief but useful history of legal education in the United
States.
* A review of English legal education in which they demonstrate (as we all should have known) its inferiority in comparison
with American legal education (even though the British system
has produced some dazzling masters of oral advocacy).
* A summary of the various proposals for change which, as
previously mentioned, came to little.
* A survey of several law school programs (Antioch, Northeastern, and Southwestern) that differ from the mainstream.
* A guide to the new techniques and technologies from the
world of computers and programmed teaching.
* An especially useful comparison of legal education and
education for the related professions of business, accounting; and
medicine.
* A summary of current thinking about bar examinations
(including the Multistate Bar Examination).
* A comprehensible s t a t e m e n t of t h e issues in t h e
competent-advocate controversy sparked by Chief Justice
Burger.
* A careful look at clinical training, the only innovation that
has really taken hold in American legal education.
The authors make no claim to complete exposition of every
subject discussed, and some of the material, particularly the history and the British comparison, is admittedly derivative, although the sources are clearly identified for those who wish more
detail. The virtue of this volume is that for the first time it is all
12. The American Bar Foundation has in progress a major study of legal education.
The original statement of the study, a prospectus as it were, is excellent. Boyer & Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL
L. REV.
221 (1974). But nothing further has surfaced to date.
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put together in one place. Although the treatment of each subject
is relatively brief, it is surprisingly complete-certainly full
enough to permit a more comprehensive overall view of American
legal education than is available anywhere else in a single volume.13
The study is also limited in its scope. The authors do not
write as reformers, and they have no explicit recommendations
for change. Rather, in their words, the effort is
to extrapolate certain trends and tendencies, make some tentative inferences, and present some projections (or speculations)
about the future of American legal education. We offer suggestions and admonitions, not so much about the structure, content, or process of legal education as about the factors that are
likely to affect efforts either to preserve the status quo or to
produce educational change.14

Despite this clear warning that the authors intend to pursue
a neutral cobrse, passing no judgments except as to whether
change (of an unspecified character) might or might not occur, I
was at first disappointed in the final section which did just this
and no more. On rereading, I think I was wrong. The important
contribution Gee and Jackson have made in presenting a
straightforward description of the forces that shape American
legal education today might have been blunted if they were seen
as advocates of particular change. By remaining neutrali5 the
authors can allow their work to stand as the excellent description
that I believe it to be of the forces that shape legal education
today and are likely to reshape it tomorrow.
If there is in the volume any element of seeming blandness
in its failure to assert strong positions, that can be corrected in
what I hope will be their next book on how to deal with the
problems of legal education in the context of the problems of
society a t large.
13. Understandably, some matters receive little or no attention. I recall, for example,
no substantial discussion of law libraries, university relations, financing of legal education, or faculty-student governance issues. Those are important matters, but not central
to the profile of legal education which is uniquely available in the Gee-Jackson study.
14. Gee & .Jackson. w p m note 6, at 703.
15. Even that is not fully accurate. In Section VII the authors express a preference,
which they state is shared by students, for training that prepares the graduate to be a
"professional"-perhaps a blend of the best in the "scholar" and the "technician." Probably every law school would claim a similar objective.

